cost to eliminate the CO, at the innum erab le sources."
There is consensus among scient ists that a s ustained increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide wi ll raise the atmospheric temperature at the earth's surface, but divergent opinion on where, how much, and how soon. However, leading scientists agree that the polar sea ice cou ld quickly disappear with relatively sma ll temperature changes. Landsberg's conclu sion is -a~ -..
•..
Tlte Iiue illdiwtes possible level of flood illg. Photo courtesy Nfl/;ollal Capital Park Service.
According to University of Maryland climatologist H. E. Landsberg, there h as been a steady rise in atmospheric carbon d ioxide since the first reliable observation in the 1860s. This observed increase in carbon dioxide parallels the gradual increase in the use of fossil fuels during the past century. In "Energy Use and the Atmosphere," prepared for the CPPP, Landsberg reports that in creased use of fossil fuels is estimated to result in the doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide between 2025 and 2050. Furthermore, once the carbon dioxide is allowed to accumu late, it is there to stay for centuries: "For all practical purposes, the process is irreversible. . No practical.technology exists or can be envisaged at an economically tolerable 6 a sobering one: "Shoul d all the sea ice melt, the sea level would rise 5 to 8 meters with major ens uing flooding of low areas." These "low areas" include Was hington, Los Angeles, and New York.
On the scientists' best guess, you and I won't be a round to bail out our cities, and, probably, neither will our children. It doesn't look good, though, for our grandchildren, and for their grandchildren it looks bleaker still. We could increase our reliance on nuclear power, of course: toxic nuclear wastes, unlike our diminishing oil reserves, last a nice long while-at lea st several dozen centuries. Solar, wind, and hydroelectric power seem less ha zardous, but perhaps more expensive, possibilities, with conservation a safer bet still. But the choice of these latter alternatives would mean that we, the present generation, would be making sacrifices on behalf of generations to come.
Why should we make such sacrifices? Many wou ld answer that we have no obligation to make any sacrifices at a ll . In 1909, Senator Henry Taller, former Secre tary of the Interior, wrote: "I do not believe there is either a moral or any other claim upon me to po.s tpone the use of what nature ha s g iven me, so that the next generation or generatio ns may ha ve an opportu nity to get w h at I myself ought to get." After a ll, one might argue, we didn't ask to be born now-any more than they asked to be born later. While it's true enough that we arrived on the scene whi le air was breathable, water was drinkable, fuel was plentiful. and the nation's major cultural centers remained above sea level. that was just the luck of the draw. If t hey find themselves being born a t a less a uspicious moment, well, they took their chances in the generational lottery and lost fair and square: tough luck, guys. OUf descendants may have reason to mourn their misfortune, but not to complai n of any injustice.
But, of course, there isn't really any such lottery. In his CPPP working paper, " International justice in Energy Policy:' phHosopher Brian Barry point s out that "all there are really are successive generations, some of which are potentiall y disadvantaged by t he actions of their predecessors." lady luck may know nothing of fairness or unfairness, but we do, and if we grab and despoil, we are accountable, in the name of justice, for what we have done. justice to w hom? To th ose who inherit the earth after we have depleted and despoiled it.
Here, however, an objection can be raised: Ju stice cannot govern OUT relation w ith our descendants, because justice, accordin g to some popular theories, obtains only among equa ls: the principles of justice are the rules by which those roughly equal in power and opportunity agree to cooperate for their mutual advantage. Realizing that all w ill be better off if each restrains him self within the bounds of the agreement, rationaL self-interested indi viduals contract w ith one anot h er to regulate th eir conduct accordingly. But among genera tions no such barga in is possible. Later generations have no bargaining power; there is nothing they can threaten and nothing they can offer.
Barry ch aracterizes this view (which he h imself rejects) by t his metaphor: each generation inhabits a single is land, arranged along a current, with all the resources located on the island farthest upstream. The generation w ith the resources must decide w hat to use and what to float downstream to the later generations. Wh at do the inhabitants of the upstream island gain by sharing resources w ith less fortunately situated islands? Not hing, it would seem. And so we can ask ourselves, in the words of Robert Heilbroner, "What has posterity ever done for me?"
If justice applies only in si tua tions of reciprocal advantage, then jus tice can not dictate our treatment of future genera tions. However, philosopher David Report from the Center for A. j. Richards, in "Contractarian Theory, Intergenerational justice, and Energy Policy:' a CPPP working paper, argues that a different kind of reciprocity is at the heart of our concept of justice. This notion of reciprocity involves not mutual actua l advantage, but w hat philosophers call universalizability or role reciproci ty: treating persons in the way one would oneself reaso nably like to be treated. We have obligations of ju stice even to th e weak and powerl ess, and these obliga tion s are precisely to treat them as we would want to be treated were we weak and powerless. Applying these principles across generations, Ric hards concludes: "Insofar as the actions of one generation directly affect th e interests of later generations, there is a relat io n among persons governable by moral reciprocity.n What matters is not what future generations have done for us, but w hat we would have liked them to have done for us h ad our temporal positions been reversed. . ,: , .1 Report Crom t he Center for ent ge neration can simpl y "solve" t h e problem of m eeting it s obli gation s to future genera tions by causin g it to be the case that t here aren't any future generations in th e fi r st place. 'You don't like boating down t he Ma ll in between the sunken monuments? Well , try not being born at all, and see ho w yo u like Ihnl!' To this challe nge, two responses are possible. The first is simply to assume it away . The human r ace iSl10f going to be deliberately exterminated; there {Ire go ing to continue to be future generations-and so the fact that ending li fe on earth mig h t be one solution to problems of in te r genera tional justice has no practical rele va nce for us in assessing our obligations to future persons.
The second response involves a radically different way altogether of vie w ing intergen eration al ju s tice . MacLean, in Energy {ll1d fhe Future, fo rth com in g from Rowman and Littlefield, proposes that, ra t her than looking at the rights and interests of future generation s, we might do better to look at our own most deeply rooted interes t s and va lues. "A better proposa L" he suggests, " is to argue that a concern for posterity is in our own interes ts-the interes ts of ourselves an d our contemporari es .
Many of the interests we va lu e most are directed not toward our own satisfaction, bu t toward the world. " We va lue scien tific research, political activ ism , and cultu ra l monuments for their contribu tions to making a bette r world, a world that wi ll endure lo ng aft er we are gon e . "The va lu e of these things requires protecting them and passin g th em on, and thi s in turn requires creating an environme n t where cu ltu re and history can conti nue in ways we like to imagine they w ill. Alternative ly, if we do not va lue posterity in thi s way, we undermine the value of these interests in our own li ves ."
Land sbe rg's statist ics about carbon dioxide buildup alarm us not merely because we r ecog ni ze an obliga tion to those who come after us, but because so much of w hat we ourselves va lu e is directed toward the continued existence and flouri shing of the human race. We do not wa nt our monum ents to be submerged because they are our monuments, o ur legacy to our descendan ts, the di stinctive mark we ha ve made on the uni ve r se. It is up to us, the members of the present ge neration , to see that thi s legacy is preserved and transmitted.
An Attack on the Social Discount Rate Economi sts and policymakers are commonly faced with determining when it makes economic se nse to invest in large-sca le public projects w hos e investment costs are immediate, but whose benefit s return only over a long period of time. In making these decisions, most economists make use of a posi tive discount rate that diminishes the v alue of costs and benefits as these occur furth er in the future-a project is worth undertaking if the discounted va lu e of its benefits is greater than the discounted value of its costs. Reliance on such a discount rate provides one rea son for believing that the present generation need not s acrifice on behalf of future generations. In the following abridgement of a portion of his Center working paper, "Energy Policy and the Further Future," Oxford University philosopher Derek ParHt argues that the social discount rate is unjus tified.
•
It is now widely believed that, when we arechoosing between social policies, we are justified in being less concerned about their more remote effects. All future costs and bene fit s may be :'discounted" at some rate of n percent per year. Unless n is very small, the further future will be heavily discounted. Thus, at a discount rate of 10%, effects on people's welfare next year count for more than ten times as much as effects in t we nty years. At the lowe r rate of 5%, effects next year count for more than a thou sa nd times as much as effects in 200 yea rs .
Such a "Social Discount Rate" seems to me indefensible. The moral importance of future event s does not decline at n percent per year. A mere difference in timing is in itself morally neutral. Remoteness in time roughly corresponds with certain other facts, w hich are morally s ignificant. But since the correlation is so rough, the Discount Rate should be abandoned .
Why was it .adopted? I am aware of six arguments.
